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The European economy is now recovering briskly, after an 
unprecedented fall in output during the second quarter 
of 2020. But this recovery is likely to be incomplete 
for some time, not least because of the substantial 
degree of social distancing measures still in place.
 
The defining feature of the present situation is that the 
remaining demand and supply obstacles are highly sector 
specific. Aggregate demand management will thus be less 
effective. Income replacement measures, such as short-
term work schemes, will be needed for some time, but 
should be applied flexibly to support rather than hinder 
structural adjustment. This also applies to the funds 
to be made available under the €750 bn Recovery and 
Resilience Facility. Money is fungible. This means that the 
key for success will not be the projects to be financed 
by the RRF, but whether member states undertake 
structural reforms that increase their growth potential.
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Europe and the Covid-19 crisis: 




The European economy is now recovering briskly, after an unprecedented fall in output during 
the second quarter of 2020. But this recovery is likely to be incomplete for some time, not least 
because of the substantial degree of social distancing measures still in place.  
The defining feature of the present situation is that the remaining demand and supply obstacles 
are highly sector specific. Aggregate demand management will thus be less effective. Income 
replacement measures, such as short-time work schemes, will be needed for some time, but 
should be applied flexibly to support rather than hinder structural adjustment. This also applies 
to the funds to be made available under the €750 bn Recovery and Resilience Facility.  
Money is fungible. This means that the key to success will not be the projects to be financed by 
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The social distancing measures put in place by many governments to deal with the Covid-19 
outbreak dealt a massive shock to the economy everywhere. The initial reaction to the 
lockdown decreed in many countries in Europe has been a generalised recession. Once the 
lockdowns were lifted, recovery could begin.  
A recovery had undoubtedly taken hold in the second quarter of 2020, but much uncertainty 
remains about its speed. The economy is a moving target, especially under the present, 
unprecedented circumstances. Hard data on the state of economy are sparse and come with 
some weeks’ delay. Certain new data sources are available in real time, but their link to 
economic data that matters in the end (i.e. GDP, employment, inflation, etc.) is untested. 
Policymaking does not have the luxury of waiting for better data; in fast-moving times such as 
these they rely on forecasts and projections to assess what economic conditions they are likely 
to face in the near future.  
The European Commission’s latest forecast suggests a wave-like pattern for (quarterly) growth 
and an incomplete recovery (even by the end of 2021). Figure 1 below shows the sharp down 
and up movement of the quarterly growth rates of member states, alongside the EU average. 
Growth is likely to turn from about minus 15% to plus 10%. But subsequent quarters should see 
a sharp slowdown in growth. 
Figure 1. Quarterly growth rates of GDP 
Source: AMECO. 
As a result of this slowdown in recovery, the Commission expects that even by 2021, the pre-
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Figures 1 and 2 illustrate considerable variability across member states in terms of the depth 
of the recession and the extent of the recovery. In some member states economic activity 
contracted by close to 20%, but in others by ‘only’ 10%. What could be the reason for these 
enormous differences? 
In part it could just be forecast errors, of course, as all the foregoing was based on projections. 
But this does not seem to be the decisive factor in this case. The little hard data available so far 
is only for Q2, 2020, but allows one to look at the factors that determined the depth of 
recession. 
The appendix to this paper reports the results of an econometric exercise that links the drop in 
GDP in Q2, 2020 (relative to Q2 in 2019, to avoid issues related to seasonality) with the severity 
of the social distancing measures put in place by member states. Researchers at Oxford 
University have developed a numerical index which measures various aspects of the restrictions 
put in place in different countries. Figure 3 below shows the evolution of this Oxford stringency 
index.1 
 
1 The stringency index is rank-scaled and built on different components such as school and workplace closures, 
restrictions on gatherings and individual movement, contact tracing, international travel restrictions, and policies 
to test for corona infections (Hale et al, 2020). The composite measure is a simple additive score of nine individual 
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Figure 3. Oxford stringency indicator (monthly averages) 
 
Source: Oxford University.  
This figure shows that there were (and remain) significant differences in the severity of the 
measures imposed in some countries (often resulting in a lockdown). 
The main finding of the empirical exercise is that the key drivers of cross-country differences in 
the loss of output in Q2, 2020 were the differences in the severity of the social distancing 
restrictions and the importance of tourism for the economy (share of this sector in GDP).2 
Neither result is surprising. Economic activity necessarily suffers when mobility is reduced and 
tourism is the economic sector that suffers the most. This is one reason why the recession has 
been particularly severe in some southern member states, where tourism accounts for more 
than 10% of GDP. Somewhat more surprising is the ‘non result’ that trade intensity (exports 
relative to GDP) seems to have no influence on the magnitude of the actual fall in GDP, despite 
the importance of trade in most member countries (and especially Germany). However, the 
steep fall in exports was accompanied by a parallel decline in imports, thereby cushioning the 
impact on GDP.3  
Figure 3 shows not only the differences in national social distancing measures as measured by 
the Oxford index, but also that the EU average (weighted by GDP), indicated by the bold line, 
has not fallen much over the last few months. Given that this indicator could explain the fall in 
GDP experienced so far, one must conclude from its relative stability at a high level that the 
recovery will not continue at its present rate. In other words, the key reason it might take some 
 
2 More technically: the strength of restrictions explains 60% of the variation of national GDP growth rates in the 
second quarter. In a weighted regression this increases to 95%. Other variables, like the share in exports or the 
size of discretionary fiscal packages to combat the crisis, are not significant at usual statistical levels. 
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time to reach a full recovery is that social distancing measures will remain in place for the time 
being. This is the most direct way in which the evolution of the pandemic weighs on the 
economy. 4 
Policy needs to foster adjustment 
The shock of the pandemic, and its accompanying social distancing restrictions, has affected 
different sectors in very different ways (e.g. air travel remains far below pre-crisis levels, 
whereas durable goods sales have almost fully recovered). At present, it is not known how long 
some of these shocks will take to play out. Moreover, the pandemic is also strongly accelerating 
pre-existing trends, such as digitalisation. What these shocks have in common is that they are 
sectoral in nature, with some being transitory (e.g. travel); and some permanent (e.g. 
digitalisation of economy). 
The challenge for policymaking is to reconcile adjustment with targeted income support. Most 
member states have either introduced or vastly expanded existing short-time work schemes. 
The basic idea behind these schemes is sound. In a sharp recession, cash-strapped enterprises 
would be tempted to fire workers with specialised skills. Mass redundancies risk destroying 
valuable relationship capital that results from continuing employment. At the same time, 
structural change is also necessary.  
For the time being most member states have already decided to extend their short-time work 
schemes into 2021. This would risk freezing the labour market. However, there is a way that 
short-time work schemes could be used to foster adjustment. At present, most schemes 
provide a subsidy only if the worker stays in the firm. This creates a de factor tax of 100% on 
adjustment and should be changed. Workers should be able to keep their replacement income 
even if they take a second, part- time or temporary job, or better change to another a sector. 
This might be politically difficult to sell, but it makes sense from an economic point of view. 
Governments can only gain if people produce something instead of being idle. The workers 
themselves would also gain by working somewhere else because an extended period of 
inactivity leads to a loss of general working skills. 
The sectoral dimension of disturbance to the economy is key  
for macroeconomic policy 
As illustrated above, some restrictions on mobility and some services requiring close contact 
remain. This implies that some sectors of the economy will remain weak for some time, while 
others have already bounced back.  
 
4 Kozlovski et al. (2020) provide additional rationale on why the economy might recover more slowly. They argue 
that the occurrence of the pandemic causes investors to increase their belief in the likelihood of a further large 
shock, thereby reducing investment.  
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In this situation governments need to look forward to a longer period during which they need 
to provide replacement income for those rendered idle by the direct and indirect impact of the 
pandemic. Moreover, some ‘GDP gap’ will persist since there remain important sectors that will 
operate below normal capacity for some time. This is already incorporated in the forecasts 
shown above. The question for macroeconomic policy is thus whether government should go 
beyond providing replacement income and try to lift aggregate demand.  
Common sense suggests that no amount of support to aggregate demand can bring the Covid-
affected sectors back to their previous level. Those previously employed in travel would remain 
unemployed, even if spending on durable goods were to increase greatly. 
Moreover, economic modelling suggests that consumers might be more careful in spending 
today when there are some goods that, temporarily, they cannot or do not want to buy. Most 
economic models supposed that many households are cash constrained and will spend a good 
portion of any transfer they receive from the government. However, this mechanism works less 
well when households today cannot afford their normal consumption basket.  
 
An example can illustrate this proposition.5 Consider a person who wants to buy new sports 
equipment or clothes to use in a gym or on holiday abroad. Normally, a higher income would 
 
5 The extreme example made by Keynes is that of shoes: if today only right-foot shoes are available consumers will 
not buy them; they would rather wait until both right and left shoes are available again as pairs. For this reason, 
interest rates will not have a big impact on consumption decisions. 
Policy implications of a sectoral recession 
Two recent papers analyse in a formal model the sectoral nature of the Covid-19 recession 
One, Guerrieri et al. (2020) considers the pandemic crisis to be a supply shock. The authors’ 
main insight is that “a 50% shock that hits all sectors is not the same as a 100% shock that hits 
half the economy.” 
The conclusion associated with the sectoral nature of the shock has several implications for 
policy. One is that standard fiscal stimulus becomes less effective than usual because the 
sectoral shutdown mutes the Keynesian multiplier feedback. 
Another recent contribution argues that Covid-19 should not be considered only as a sectoral 
supply shock (because of government-ordered social distancing measures), but also as a 
sectoral demand shock as households and firms voluntarily reduce demand for travel, tourism 
and other contact-intensive services. Farhi and Baqaee (2020) study supply and demand 
shocks in a general disaggregated model across multiple sectors. A major element in their 
approach is the input-output linkages across sectors that propagate these sectoral shocks 
(both demand and supply) to the entire economy.  
Their major finding is that “aggregate demand stimulus is only about a third as effective as in 
a typical recession”. This finding applies to both fiscal and monetary policy. The authors also 
argue that “More targeted forms of demand stimulus deliver better bang for the buck.” 
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make it more likely that the entire consumption basket (vacation and sports equipment) is 
bought today. But if today, due to the pandemic, foreign travel is impossible and gyms are 
closed, the sports equipment and clothes will not be bought. Higher cash transfers would 
probably just lead to more savings. The counterpart to higher government deficits (over and 
above those needed to provide substitute incomes) would thus lead mainly to higher savings – 
as one could observe this summer. 
The observation that aggregate demand stimulus becomes less efficient in a sectoral recession 
implies that one should not judge deficits by the metrics used during normal recessions; namely 
by relating the deficit to the output gap or the unemployment rate. Both metrics are misleading 
in the current circumstances. Any remaining fiscal space should be used to support adjustment 
and new jobs, rather than to try to fill the bank accounts of households with transfers they are 
likely to save. Authors Coibon et al. (2020) find that US consumers saved most of the transfers 
distributed under the US CARES Act.6 
The Recovery and Resilience Fund 
The RRF represents a key step towards European solidarity and provides a new source of 
European safe assets. Although it has not yet been implemented, it has already had an impact 
on financial markets, including lower risk premia for some countries and a stronger demand for 
euro assets from the rest of the world. 
An economic evaluation of the direct impact of the RRF must start from a simple, but 
fundamental proposition: money is fungible. This applies in several dimensions. 
Money is fungible over time 
Most of the funds from the RRF will be disbursed only after 2021, i.e. after the crisis, has 
(hopefully) been overcome. However, it would be a mistake to conclude from this delayed 
disbursement that the RRF has been irrelevant during this year’s crisis. 
First of all, the announcement of the agreement reached at the marathon European Council in 
July already further stabilised markets and ensured continuing market access, even for high-
debt countries. Earlier forceful action by the ECB in March and April prevented the emergence 
of a liquidity and financial crisis. But some risk spreads remained relatively elevated. After the 
agreement on the RRF, market access further improved and borrowing costs for the peripheral 
countries fell. Borrowing costs are now very favourable with, for example, Italian 10-year rates 
at around 1%; which does not constitute an all-time low but is lower than in January of 2020. 
Similarly, Spanish 10-year yields are now below 0.4 %, lower than they were at the start of the 
year.  
 
6 Coibion et al. (2020), “How US consumers use their stimulus payments”, vox.eu, 8 September. 
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The combination of market access at favourable rates and the knowledge that the RRF financing 
will arrive in a few years allows member countries to shift some spending towards today 
because the future reductions in national spending can be offset by EU funds.  
With market access ensured for all, there is also little need to accelerate payments. From a 
political point of view, it might be desirable to show that EU funds can arrive quickly. From an 
economic point of view, however, it matters little whether the EU funds are disbursed one year 
earlier or later. This ‘economic’ view is based on the understanding that national spending will 
be reduced when the Next Generation EU (NGEU) funds are being disbursed. If this is not the 
case, there is a risk that the NGEU package might become de facto pro-cyclical.  
Money is fungible across sectors 
The financing provided by the RRF will be provided for projects that will be screened by the 
Commission and that should fit the overall aim of the RRF: to foster a sustainable and digital 
recovery.  
Here again one finds a contrast between the political and the economic logic. Member states 
are likely to present their best projects for financing under the RRF for the simple reason that 
this will ensure that they can qualify for the funds, and more quickly than if they were to present 
low-quality projects. Once the financing of these high-value projects has been ensured by the 
RRF, member states can use the fiscal space that has been liberated according to their own 
priorities.  
 
In its Q&A on the RRF the Commission emphasises both investment projects and reform plans: 
To access the facility, Member States should prepare recovery and resilience plans 
setting out their reform and investment agendas for the subsequent four years, until 
This fungibility of international financial support is not specific to the RRF, or EU funds in 
general. A generally accepted maxim in the context of development aid is that  
‘Aid does not pay for the item it is accounted for but for the marginal expenditure it makes 
possible.’ 
This maxim applies to the RRF as well. Fungibility does not imply that the RRF is worthless, 
but that its overall macroeconomic benefits cannot be measured by the quality of the 
projects on which the funds are spent; rather the additional fiscal space it creates for highly 
indebted member states and the reforms that are implemented because of the overall 
conditionality of the RFF. It is this latter element that will be decisive for the ultimate success 
of the RRF.   
Again, this insight is not specific to the RFF or EU programmes. As Dollar and Prichett (1998) 
put it: 
“Aid is financing the entire public sector, and the overall quality of policies and institutions is 
the key to securing a large return from this finance.” 
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2024. These plans should comprise both reforms and public investment projects 
through a coherent package. 
The arguments presented here underpin the view that the reforms are the key elements; 
effective structural reforms constitute a condition sine qua non for the success of the RRF. 
How to green the RRF 
Member states will have proposed their own projects and plans for how to spend the grants 
and loans from the RRF. In principle, at least 30% should be devoted to ‘climate’. But how can 
one ensure value added, hopefully European value added, from the RFF financing? Here again, 
one needs to distinguish between appearances and economic logic. 
The EU’s current climate goals are largely based on numerical targets. The most prominent 
example is the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) with its cap on emissions, enforced via a carbon 
price, based on EU-wide demand for the limited allowed emissions. With the existing cap on 
emissions, EU spending on sectors covered by ETS (renewables, industry) just lowers the price 
of ETS emission certificates.  
In other sectors (e.g. cars, energy-efficient building, etc.) there are already a variety of national 
and EU targets. In these sectors spending the RRF package will only relieve governments and/or 
the private sector of their obligations. The same logic applies to other parts of the green 
agenda, such as the circular economy. 
The overall conclusion is that hundreds of billions of euro of green spending under the RFF risks 
leading to a result (in terms of emissions or recycling) no better than already planned before 
Covid, unless green targets (emissions, standards for automobiles, recycling, etc.) are tightened 
at the same time. 
The principle that funds are fungible applies only if markets work, of course. This means that 
there are areas where the RRF can yield European value added. One important area where 
markets work only imperfectly is networks, for example power transmission or 
telecommunication.7 Targeted investment in stronger networks, especially measures that 
strengthen the connection between the national networks, could yield a high European value 
added. What is needed in the area of networks is not only funding, but different structures. The 
power (and telecommunication) networks are still supervised by national authorities, which 
have a tendency to protect their domestic operators. The dispersion of renewable energy 
sources across Europe would in principle yield large benefits in ensuring against the 
intermittency of both sun and wind. But this would require a much larger degree of integration 
 
7 Another classic case where European value added is possible concerns areas (like low carbon steel, cement) 
where totally new production methods are needed. In this case, EU financing for development, pilot testing, and 
industry scale demonstration might be useful to prepare for large-scale deployment to bring costs down (as 
happened for renewables and EVs). 
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of the power networks, which are still operated and supervised on the basis of national energy 
policy goals.  
The most important drawback of the RRF is that it is not focused on those areas where 
European value added could be the greatest.  
Conclusions 
It is often said that generals fight the last war. Today, European policymakers are trying to avoid 
the mistakes of the last crisis period. This has been the right approach so far. Action by the ECB 
has been instrumental in preventing another ‘euro crisis’. The large package of EU-funded 
grants for member states in difficulty approved under the NGEU package in July of this year 
represents an important step towards European solidarity and a mobilisation of common fiscal 
resources. 
But there remains one ‘lesson learnt’ that might not be applicable today. This is that the 
government must step in when private demand is too weak. This general rule seems 
appropriate in a ‘normal’ recession when demand weakens because of a tightening of financial 
condition or some other macroeconomic shock. But, ‘this time is different’. 
The Covid-19 recession (and the recovery) is different because it is the result of very sector-
specific demand and supply disturbances. The key differentiating point is the sectoral 
specificity, not the demand or supply nature of the disturbance. Aggregate supply shocks are 
known to be ‘stagflationary’, i.e. they should depress output while inflation increases. This is 
not the case today. Aggregate demand shocks are deflationary, i.e. both output and inflation 
fall. An easing of fiscal policy is entirely appropriate in this case. However, attempts to stimulate 
aggregate demand cannot return the economy to full employment if several sectors are subject 
to both negative demand and supply shocks. 
Aggregate demand management is thus likely to be less effective today in speeding up the 
recovery. Faced with this situation, those overseeing fiscal policy have two options: one 
reaction would be, given the lower effectiveness of these instruments, to increase the dose 
(even higher deficits until the output gap is closed). Another reaction would be to rein in deficits 
until more normal times return. The choice between these two reactions must depend on the 
cost of public debt. If one considers debt as free because interest rates are zero, a strategy of 
‘doubling the dose’ would seem appropriate. This might be feasible for countries with low 
starting debt levels. But experience shows that after a certain level debt is no longer free 
because risk premia increase. This would suggest that high debt countries should be more 
prudent. 
The RRF represents a fundamental advance in European integration. Its great political value 
should, however, not lead one to neglect some fundamental economic relations. Ultimately, 
the value of the RRF will not be the specific projects it finances, but the extent to which it fosters 
structural reforms.  
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A similar observation applies to the concept of a ‘green recovery’. The benefit for the climate 
should not be measured by the emissions avoided through the projects financed by the RRF, 
but by the reduction in overall EU-wide emissions that can be achieved over the next decade. 
The latter requires more ambitious climate targets, not just the generous financing of green 
projects for a few years. 
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Appendix: Econometric results, Oxford University Index 
Dependent Variable: Fall in GDP Q22020/Q22019   
Method: Least Squares Sample: 1 27,  
Included observations: 19   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
     
     C 0.0005 0.0006 0.746 0.4665 
TOURISM -0.989 0.48 
 
-2.073 0.0547 
STRINGENCY -0.233 0.0466 
 
-4.997 0.0001 
     
     R-squared 0.96   Mean dependent var -0.007 
Adjusted R-squared 0.95   S.D. dependent var 0.01 
S.E. of regression 0.0022   Akaike info criterion -9.2 
Sum squared resid 7.84E-05   Schwarz criterion -9.1 
Log likelihood 90.8   Hannan-Quinn criter. -9.2 
F-statistic 190.9   Durbin-Watson stat 3.24 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
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